Firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience significantly higher returns when there are fewer external monitors in place at the target firm. Using analyst coverage and institutional ownership as measures of external monitoring presence, we find that low-monitored activist targets experience abnormal returns 18.94% (1,894 bp) above that of high-monitored targets in the two-year period following the initial activist disclosure filing. The significant effect of external monitoring remains after controlling for target firm and activist characteristics. We also document improvements in traditional operating performance measures at low-monitored target firms across the same two-year period, consistent with the observed market performance.
Introduction
External monitoring of the firm has long been framed as an effective mechanism to reduce agency conflicts and ultimately increase firm value (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). These external monitors, typically institutional investors or stock analysts, observe firm management and intervene when the manager is acting sub-optimally. Prior literature confirms this theory, producing strong empirical evidence that high levels of analyst coverage and institutional ownership are correlated with better corporate governance and reduced agency conflicts. 1
More recently, hedge fund activists have also become involved in monitoring firm management.
The activist targets a firm by taking a large ownership stake; they then typically proceed by electing new firm leadership or influencing incumbent management to reorganize some aspect of firm operations. The activist, and more directly, existing shareholders, will only benefit from this intervention and reorganization if the end result is an increase in firm value. In this sense, hedge fund activists perform a similar role to the existing external monitors. Consequently, hedge fund activism may be a more effective mechanism for increasing firm value when there is an inadequate monitoring presence simply because these firms have more room to improve.
On the other hand, external monitors may be instrumental in the process by which hedge fund activists seek to increase firm value. External monitors can be an influential advocate for the activist throughout a campaign. For example, Chung and Teo (2011) and Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2016) find evidence that analysts provide favorable recommendations to firms bought and sold by hedge funds in general. Moreover, a common strategy used by hedge fund activists is the threat or initiation of a proxy contest. Not only does Fos (2016) find these proxy contests to generate short and long-term abnormal returns, these contests are more likely to involve firms having high institutional ownership -a consequence of the shareholder support that is needed for a successful outcome. Consistent with this notion, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016a) and He and Li (2016) both find evidence suggesting that active and passive institutional owners support hedge fund activists, ultimately increasing the likelihood that the activist will achieve their campaign objectives.
Additionally, the hedge fund activist literature frequently cites high institutional ownership as a key characteristic for predicting which firms will eventually become subject to a hedge fund activist campaign (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Gantchev and Jotikasthira, 2017) . In many cases, hedge fund activists use both existing and potential institutional shareholders to form "wolf packs" that collectively support the efforts of the hedge fund activist (Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner, 2014; Coffee and Palia, 2015; Wong, 2016; He and Li, 2016) .
The evidence supporting the view that analysts and institutions are effective monitors having a preference for well governed firms suggests that, in some cases, hedge fund activism may not be an effective tool to add substantial value for existing shareholders. If hedge fund activism is a substitute for traditional monitoring or if existing external monitors simply prefer firms that are already well governed, then shareholders of firms having fewer external monitors in place will benefit more from a hedge fund activist campaign. Our study investigates this natural link between the existing monitoring presence and the subsequent benefits to shareholders from hedge fund activist campaigns. Specifically, we determine whether a firm's level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership are useful proxies for assessing how beneficial hedge fund activism will be for existing shareholders, in the form of improved stock performance and firm operations.
Using a sample of hedge fund activist campaign Form 13D filings occurring during the years 2001 to 2014, we find that activist hedge funds are more likely to improve both stock and operating performance in firms (henceforth referred to as "targets") that have fewer external monitors in place. Our findings are persistent when considering the target's size-adjusted analyst coverage and institutional ownership as measures of external monitoring activity. Additionally, we construct a "monitoring index" that considers the target's size-adjusted levels of analyst coverage and institutional ownership jointly.
Conditional on the target firm's degree of external monitoring presence at the hedge fund activist target date, we find substantial heterogeneity in the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) that are generated over the course of the activist's campaign. In particular, there is an economically and statistically significant spread between the average BHARs of portfolios formed on the basis of the target's degree of size-adjusted external monitoring presence. Over the days t − 10 to t + 25 (t the date of activist disclosure) we find that firms with low analyst coverage earn short-term BHARs that are 3.04% (304 bps) higher than firms with high analyst coverage, on average. Similarly, when comparing target firms with the lowest level of institutional ownership to those with the highest, the spread in short-term BHARs is an economically and statistically significant 3.64% (364 bps), on average. Using our monitoring index, BHARs are 3.30% (330 bps) higher for low versus high monitoring index portfolios.
While we find significant differences in short-term returns, the effects of external monitoring become even more apparent in the long-term. Using returns occurring over the months t − 1 to t + 24, where t is the initial target month, the spread increases to an economically and statistically significant 21.22%, 19.15%, and 18.94% for the analyst coverage, institutional ownership, and monitoring index portfolios. The magnitude and significance of these return differences remain after controlling for a wide range of firm characteristics in a multivariate setting.
A second potential channel through which we can observe the benefits of hedge fund activism is by improvements in the fundamentals of the firm. Prior research suggests that existing monitors will improve the operating efficiency of the firm (Chen et al., 2015; Harford et al., 2015; Appel et al., 2016b) . Therefore, we conjecture that the same relation between the ex-ante external monitoring presence of a firm and subsequent stock performance is present when we consider changes in fundamentals. That is, the degree of improvement in a target firm's operating efficiency and firm value over the course of a hedge fund activism campaign is decreasing in the level of external monitors in place. We indeed find that this is the case. For example, a one level increase in a firm's monitoring index corresponds with economically and statistically significant decreases of 0.90% (90 bps) and 1.10% (110 bps) in return on assets (ROA) and cash flow to total assets (CF /TA) from the year before the activist's arrival to the year after. Similarly, over this same time period, we find a one level increase in a firm's monitoring index corresponds with an economically and statistically significant decrease of -0.09 in Tobins's q. These effects are robust to the consideration of various firm specific characteristics and the hedge fund activist's stated intentions.
To further support our results, we complete two robustness tests. First, using a buy-and-hold approach with the market return as a benchmark is limiting in the sense that we do not account for firm characteristics that have been shown in the asset pricing literature to explain variations in returns. Therefore, we consider a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) approach using the FamaFrench three, four, and five-factor models as benchmarks. Specifically, for each firm we estimate a factor model over a pre-campaign window and use the estimated factor loadings to determine the abnormal returns that are generated over the campaign. Our results are robust to this approach with the low monitoring index firms generating higher CARs than the high monitoring index firms over both the short-term and long-term.
Second, it is possible that hedge fund activists find it easier to market a target firm for potential acquisition if the firm has a lower external monitoring presence. Such a result would be consistent with Greenwood and Schor (2009) , who find that a majority of the short and long-term BHARs generated by hedge fund activists are driven by those firms that are acquired in the 18 months following the initial 13D filing month. However, when we exclude the target firms that are acquired in our sample, we continue to find that a lower ex-ante external monitoring presence leads to higher BHARs both in the short-term and long-term horizon.
We make two primary contributions to the hedge fund activist literature. First, we show that a firm's existing external monitoring presence, as measured by the level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership, is significantly related to the abnormal returns and improvements in operating performance that are generated during an activist campaign. Second, our findings suggest that the benefits which some firms experience from hedge fund activism are not entirely unique from the effects of traditional external monitoring by institutional owners and analysts. That is, from the perspective of existing shareholders of firms already having a strong external monitoring presence, hedge fund activism acts more as a substitute than a value-adding endeavor.
Data

Activist Sample
To construct our sample of hedge fund activist events, we collect all 13D and 13D/A filings over the years 2001 to 2014 from the Audit Analytics (AA) database. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act requires any investor to file a 13D within a 10 day window of the date at which the investor exceeds a 5% stake in a publicly traded firm and has the intention to pursue some form of activist agenda. We consider the date on this form to be the hedge fund activist's initial target date and the beginning of their campaign with the firm. Additionally, any change in the investor's initial intentions or stake in the respective target firm requires the activist to file an amended Form 13D/A. The AA database includes all 13D and 13D/A filings from the SEC over the years 2001 to 2014 along with data classifications that include the name of the activist filer, the target firm's name, the percentage stake, and the stated intentions of the activist, which are disclosed in Hedge fund activists are the primary group of interest in our study and AA does not distinguish this class of investors among their comprehensive database of 13D filers. Therefore, we take the following steps to identify whether the listed activist filer is a hedge fund activist. First, we begin with the complete sample of 13D and 13D/A filings in the Audit Analytics database and identify the names of hedge fund activists by matching filer names to hedge fund activists in the sample used by Brav et al. (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) . 3 With the remaining 13D and 13D/A filings whose filer is not in this sample, we restrict to only those labeled as an initial 13D, to those filings whose target has a share code of 10 and 11, and to those filings whose target has an available PERMNO and GVKEY for the CRSP and Compustat databases. These additional restrictions leave us with 6,259 unique shareholder activist filer names that must be verified as that of a hedge fund activist.
To identify these remaining names, we follow a procedure initially put forth by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) . 4 First, we check each filer's SEC-ADV filing to confirm that they charge an incentive fee and that they have at least 50% of their assets in hedge funds or at least 50% of their assets owned by high net worth individuals. In this filing, hedge fund investors fall under the "Pooled investment vehicles (other than investment companies)" classification in Section D of Item 5: "Information About Your Advisory Business". As additional confirmation and for those filers that do not file a Form ADV, we use the web to confirm the respective filer is a hedge fund.
Because managers and hedge funds can sometimes be assigned different Central Index Keys (CIK) 2 For example, if an activist files an initial 13D with a stated purpose classified as discussion, but later files an amended 13D/A with a purpose falling under dispute, both discussion and dispute are the classification used for the initial 13D filing.
3 We thank Wei Jiang and her coauthors for providing us with their updated hedge fund activist sample used in Brav et al. (2008) and Brav et al. (2015) .
4 See Griffin and Xu (2009) and Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) for other published studies using this method.
by the SEC, we aggregate all filings at the hedge fund level when possible.
After identifying all possible hedge fund activists, we make the following final restrictions to our 13D filing sample. Consistent with prior studies, we delete those filers having only one initial 13D and whose only stated intention classification throughout the campaign (i.e. 13D and 13D/A) consists of "Investment purposes", "Not applicable, no change or no intent stated", "Bankruptcy settlement", "Stock delisted", "Intends to sell or reduce stake", or any combination of these five.
If an activist filing is labeled as a 13D in the AA database and the same activist has filed a 13D for the same firm in the previous three years, we treat this as an amendment to the initial filing labeled as 13D. Additionally, we require that our target firms have annual financial data in Compustat for the calendar years t − 1 and t, where t is the filing year, and that the target firm has a stock price greater than $1 on the initial 13D filing date. In the event that the initial 13D filing date is not a trading day, we use the first trading day after the filing date.
Our final sample consists of 1,719 initial 13D filings from 391 unique hedge fund activists for 1,292 unique target firms. 5 Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of events by year along with the aggregate dollar value of the initial stakes obtained by hedge fund activists within the year.
An increase in activist activity precedes the financial crisis, peaking at 220 events during 2007 with an aggregate dollar value in initial stakes of roughly $19 billion. The ensuing decrease in activity during the financial crisis is expected because the hedge fund asset class struggled during this time period. Moreover, the frequency and dollar value of hedge fund activist events in the post-crisis period have yet to regain their respective pre-crisis highs.
Panel B of Table 1 provides a distribution of hedge fund activist activity across the 12 FamaFrench industry classifications. Within our activist sample, Business equipment (395 events), Financials (317 events), Consumer discretionary (210 events) and Healthcare (158 events) account for nearly 63% of our observations. In panel C, we show the average number of targets per activist to be four firms, with targets being engaged by 1.33 activists, on average. Table 2 are not mutually exclusive. The most frequent intentions listed by hedge fund activists can be categorized as the intent to engage in some form of discussion with management (1,163 events; 67.66% of the sample) or to express some type of concern regarding the firm (797 events; 46.36% of the sample). The most contentious activist campaigns fall under the Disputes category and in aggregate account for 23.85% of our sample. Aside from the standard "investment purposes" terminology that is used in nearly every 13D filing, the "intent to change or nominate the board of directors" and "reserve the right to hold discussions with management" account for nearly 59% of our sample.
Firm Characteristics
We obtain financial data through the year 2016 from the Compustat database and we winsorize all Compustat data at the 1% level. 6 We obtain stock price and shares outstanding data over this same time period from CRSP. The two measures of monitoring presence that we use are the level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership percentage. We gather analyst data from Thomson Financials' Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). For institutional ownership data, we use the Thomson Reuters 13F database. Institutions having assets under management in excess of $100 million are required by the SEC to file a 13F report. An institution's quarterly 13F report consists of all holdings as of the end of the quarter for which they own more than 10,000 shares or the market value of the holding exceeds $200,000 as of the reporting date. Table 3 shows various fundamental summary statistics for our sample of hedge fund activist target firms compared to the entire Compustat universe over the years 2001 to 2014. All fundamentals are computed using data taken from each target firm's most recent annual financial statement prior to the respective initial 13D filing. The characteristics of our sample are consistent with those identified in many previous studies, including Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009) . Many hedge fund activists can be categorized as classic value investors. As shown in Table 3 , target firms have lower market caps and lower market-to-book ratios than their peers. Moreover, target firms exhibit weaker growth and relatively lower overall firm value, as measured by Tobin's q. Consistent with prior literature, target firms experience poor market-adjusted performance leading up to the activist's intervention date and have a higher level of institutional ownership than their peers.
Monitoring Portfolios
We form target firm monitoring portfolios within our hedge fund activist event sample based on two measures of monitoring presence. The first monitoring measure we use is the level of analyst coverage. To compute this measure, we count the number of unique analysts who have submitted at least one earnings forecast to the I/B/E/S database in any of the four quarters before that initial 13D filing quarter. 7 Our second measure of monitoring presence is the level of institutional ownership. For each of our target firms, we use the Thomson 13F filings data to aggregate the total shares held by institutions and, consistent with our calculation of analyst coverage, we average institutional ownership over the four quarters before the initial 13D filing quarter.
A concern with our measures of external monitoring is that they are positively correlated with firm size. We therefore focus on a size-adjusted level of monitoring. We regress the level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership onto the target firm market capitalizations and use the residual from these models as the basis for creating high, mid, and low analyst coverage and institutional ownership monitoring portfolios. 8 This technique focuses our analysis on the abnormal, firm sizeadjusted level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership, which ensures that our results are driven by the effects of monitoring rather than omitted variables that are correlated with firm size.
The last external monitoring measure we use is a monitoring index constructed from a firm's size-adjusted levels of analyst coverage and institutional ownership. We construct each firm's monitoring index as the sum of the firm's analyst coverage and institutional ownership portfolio placements. The range of the monitoring index is two to six where two represents the lowest level of external monitoring and six represents the highest level of external monitoring. We use a firm's monitoring index as the primary variable of interest in our tests which allows us to observe the joint impact of analyst coverage and institutional ownership on hedge fund activism. 9
7 For this calculation, we exclude all analyst data that have an anonymous analyst code (i.e. ANALYS='000000'). 8 For 92 of our target events, the institutional ownership of the target firm in the 13F database exceeds 100% as of the quarter before the target date. We change these observations to be 100% for our regressions. Imposing this restriction does not materially affect our results.
9 Our results are qualitatively similar if we consider analyst coverage or institutional ownership separately.
Empirical Methods and Results
The most direct way that hedge fund activism may benefit the existing shareholders of a target firm is through superior stock performance. Therefore, we first focus on the target firm's stock performance following the intervention of a hedge fund activist. Second, existing shareholders will benefit if the target firm experiences improvements in fundamentals. We therefore analyze changes to a target firm's operating performance and firm value around the target year. Our analysis is predicated on the research question of whether the benefits from hedge fund activism for existing shareholders are conditional on the ex-ante external monitoring presence, as proxied by the level of institutional ownership and analyst coverage.
Monitoring Portfolio Stock Performance -Univariate Analysis
We measure both short-term and long-term stock performance of our target firms around the initial 13D filing date using market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). Specifically, we compute the buy-and-hold return for each target firm over the respective window and use the buy-and-hold return of the CRSP value-weighted index over the same time period as a benchmark. 10 Table 4 Table 4 displays the difference in the average BHAR between the low and high monitoring portfolios, as well as the t-statistics from a difference in means test for each window.
For ease of interpretation of our results in Table 4 , we plot the average BHAR at each day for the low and high monitoring portfolios. These daily plots are the left figure in each panel of Figure 1 . As shown in the plots, beginning 10 days before the initial 13D filing date, there is a considerable spread in BHAR generated from the low monitoring portfolios outperforming the high monitoring portfolios that is maintained throughout the [t − 10, t + 25] day window. Table 4 shows that the differences in short-term BHAR displayed in Figure 1 are statistically significant. Panel A of Table 4 displays the BHARs of our analyst coverage monitoring portfolios. The spread in BHAR over the [t − 10, t + 25] day window is 3.04% and significant at the 5% level. In Panels B and C of Table 4 we consider monitoring portfolios formed based on a firm's institutional ownership and monitoring index. As in Panel A, the spread in institutional ownership and monitoring index portfolios reaches similar magnitudes of 3.64% and 3.30% over the [t − 10, t + 25] day window, each difference statistically significant at the 1% level.
We next focus on long-term BHARs. The right figure in each of the panels of Figure 1 We also find significant differences in the long-term BHARs for the institutional ownership portfolios. As shown in Panel B of Table 4 , at the [t − 1, t + 6] month window, low institutional ownership target firms have an average BHAR that exceeds the average BHAR generated by high institutional ownership target firms by 10.36%, significant at the 1% level. As before, this spread nearly doubles over the [t − 1, t + 24] month window, reaching 19.15%, significant at the 1% level.
We consider the joint effect of analyst coverage and institutional ownership in Panel C of Table   4 . As in previous panels, we observe a considerable, statistically significant spread between the low and high monitoring index portfolios at every long-term window considered. At the [t − 1, t + 6] month window, low monitoring index target firms have an average BHAR that exceeds the average BHAR generated by high monitoring index target firms by 10.08%, significant at the 1% level. This spread increases to 18.94% over the [t − 1, t + 24] month window, significant at the 1% level.
Monitoring Portfolio Stock Performance -Multivariate Analysis
We next consider whether the positive abnormal returns generated in the low monitoring portfolios are driven by observable firm characteristics or by the activist's agenda. To do this, we use the following OLS regression to control for these possible effects.
The dependent variable of this regression is the target firm's market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over a specified window. The independent variable of interest is M ON IT OR, which is the target firm's monitoring index measured as of the most recent quarter before the initial 13D filing quarter, as described in section 2.3. 11
Our regressions also include standard controls for firm characteristics. We control for size and market-to-book effects by including the log of the target firm's market cap as of the 13D filing date and the firm's market-to-book ratio computed from the firm's most recent financial statements before the 13D filing. We include investment and leverage measures taken from the firm's most recent financial statements before the 13D filing. These measures include R&D expense to total assets, capital expenditures to total assets, market leverage and cash to total assets. We include complexity measures such as firm age, computed as the number of months the firm appears in the CRSP database, and the firm's number of business segments, which we obtain from Compustat.
Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), we include four additional return based measures.
These measures include a firm's return over the previous 12 months, the average monthly illiquidity, the average market beta, and the average monthly idiosyncratic volatility. We compute a firm's average monthly illiquidity following Amihud (2002) and then multiply the measure by 10 8 . To compute a firm's beta, each month we use the past 12 months of daily returns and the CRSP valueweighted index. This process results in a monthly time series of betas which we then average. We compute a firm's monthly idiosyncratic volatility for each firm using the Fama-French three-factor model and use the average as our final control. With the exception of the models using the shortterm BHAR as a dependent variable, all averaging of monthly illiquidity, betas, and idiosyncratic volatility is across the same window as the respective BHAR. For short-term BHAR, these controls are computed over the prior 12 months before the month of the 13D filing.
Last, we include fixed effects for the target firm's 12 Fama-French industry classification (IN D), as well as controls for the hedge fund activist's stated intent in the 13D and 13D/A filings throughout the campaign (P U RP OSE). There are four non-mutually exclusive intents that a campaign can fall under, each represented by an indicator variable taking the value of one if the respective campaign falls under the given category. As described in Table 2 , these intent categories include
Corporate Governance / Control, Discussions, Disputes, and Concerns. month BHAR of roughly 1, 410 bps, on average, for a one level increase in monitoring index.
In Table 5 there is a consistent theme from the coefficients on many of the control variables.
The control coefficients suggest that large, liquid firms with higher market-to-book ratios generate the lowest BHARs. There is also moderate variation in the effect that the type of activism has on the campaign BHARs. For instance, those activists listing agenda items in the Discussion category generate [t − 1, t + 3] and [t − 1, t + 6] month BHAR that are 370 bps and 420 bps higher, on average, while those activist campaigns involving a dispute seem to generate more negative BHAR over the longer-term horizons.
Monitoring Portfolio Change in Fundamentals
Generating positive abnormal stock returns is the most direct channel through which existing shareholders of a target firm can benefit from the intervention of a hedge fund activist. Alterna-tively, shareholders can benefit from hedge fund activism if there are material improvements to the fundamentals of the target firm. Because we have shown that the abnormal returns generated from hedge fund activism are decreasing in a firm's ex-ante presence of external monitors, we expect the improvements in fundamentals to also share this conditional relation. Moreover, material changes in the fundamentals of our target firms may help to explain why we find the large difference in stock performance among our monitoring portfolios.
Our analysis considers changes to fundamental measures encompassing operating performance and firm value. These measures include a target firm's ROA, cash flow to total assets (CF/TA), and Tobin's q. The construction of each of these variables is as described in Table 3 . Changes in our fundamental measures are computed for four different time periods relative to the initial 13D filing year t: years (t − 1) to (t + 1), (t − 1) to (t + 2), (t − 2) to (t + 1), and (t − 2) to (t + 2). As before, we use the following OLS regression specification to control for the possible effects of firm characteristics, hedge fund activist intent, industry and time.
Here F U N D i designates a dependent variable that is either the change in firm i's ROA, CF/TA, or Tobin's q over the specified time period. The independent variable of interest is M ON IT OR where we use the target firm's monitoring index that we used in regression (1). Similarly, the controls are identical to those used in regression (1), with the addition of year fixed effects. Table 6 displays the results of regression (2) using changes in ROA as the dependent variable.
Each of the monitoring index coefficients is negative and statistically significant, suggesting ROA is decreasing in a firm's monitoring index level. In model (1), the monitoring index coefficient is −0.009, significant at the 5% level. This loading equates to a decrease in ROA from year (t − 1) to (t + 1) of 90 bps, on average, for a one level increase in monitoring index. Similarly, the loading in model (4) corresponds to a decrease in ROA from year (t − 2) to (t + 2) of 140 bps for a one level increase in a firm's monitoring index, significant at the 1% level. A similar negative relation appears in models (2) and (3).
The negative relation is also present in Table 7 where we use changes in CF/TA as the dependent variable of regression (2). In particular, from model (1) of Table 7 we find a one level increase in a firm's monitoring index corresponds to a decrease in CF/TA of 110 bps over the years (t − 1) to (t + 1), significant at the 5% level. Likewise, model (4) suggests that a one level increase in monitoring index equates to a decrease in CF/TA of 170 bps over the years (t − 2) to (t + 2), significant at the 1% level.
In Table 8 , we consider changes in firm valuation. Using the changes in Tobin's q as the dependent variable, the results from regression 2 suggest a higher monitoring index level corresponds to decreases in firm value. In models (1) and (4) of Table 8 , the monitoring index coefficients are -0.090 and -0.177, significant at the 5% and 1% levels. As shown in Table 3 , the average Tobin's q of our sample is 1.80, which suggests changes in Tobin's q of this magnitude equate to decreases in firm value of roughly 5.00% and 9.83%.
The coefficients on our model control variables throughout Tables 6, 7 , and 8, are mixed. The results from our analysis of changes in fundamentals demonstrate yet another channel through which shareholders of firm's with a lower ex-ante external monitoring presence benefit from hedge fund activism. Just as we found with target firm stock performance, the degree that hedge fund activism positively changes fundamentals is decreasing in the level of institutional ownership and analyst coverage before the start of a campaign. This relation persists when we consider hedge fund activist intentions and other important firm characteristics including firm size, leverage, and investment. Overall, our results show that positive, tangible changes to operating performance and firm value are less likely to occur in target firms that already have an adequate presence of external monitors. 12
Robustness
We next examine the robustness of our results. First, to compliment our buy-and-hold return results, we use a cumulative abnormal return approach. In doing so, we provide an additional perspective that again accounts for differences in risk exposure among firms in our monitoring portfolios. Second, an alternative explanation for the abnormal stock performance of the low monitoring presence portfolios is that this performance may be driven by those firms that are eventually acquired during the hedge fund activist campaign. We address each of these considerations.
Monitoring Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Our additional analysis of stock performance follows the methods used by Greenwood and Schor (2009) . We use the daily and monthly windows around the initial 13D filing date as in Table 4 and compute each firm's daily and monthly abnormal returns using various asset pricing models that are standard in the asset pricing literature. These asset pricing models account for differences in risk exposure among the firms in our monitoring portfolios. For example, it could be the case that less monitored firm's have lower market to book ratios, thereby making the abnormal returns generated by these firm's more of a value effect than a hedge fund activism effect. Similarly, a target firm's monitoring presence may also be correlated with the level of profitability or investment.
To account for the effects of size, value, momentum, profitability and investment, we use the Fama-French three, four, and five-factor models (Fama and French, 1993, 2014) . 13 Using these models, we compute the abnormal returns of each target firm over various long and short-term windows around the initial 13D filing.
12 Additionally, we consider changes in dividend payout policy and share buybacks of our target firms. We find little consistency among our results and conclude that a target firm's external monitoring presence is unrelated to how hedge fund activism affects future changes in payout policy. These results are available upon request.
13 We obtain the factors for these models from Kenneth R. French's website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/faculty/ken.french/.
The abnormal return of target firm i at time t + 1, denoted AR i,t+1 , is
Here, R i,t+1 is the target firm's realized return andR i,t+1 is the predicted return from a factor model regression that is estimated over a time period prior to the event window. Specifically, using a three-factor model, we estimate,
We use the estimated coefficients in (4) to get the predicted return at time t + 1 for target firm i
For each target firm, we sum the abnormal returns in (3) to obtain the firm's CAR over a [t − 10, t + 25] day window and a [t − 1, t + 24] month window, where t is the 13D filing date and month, respectively. For daily CAR, we estimate regression (4) using daily returns over the [t − 120, t − 20] day window. For monthly CARs, we estimate regression (4) using monthly returns over the [t − 25, t − 1] month window. In both cases, if there is insufficient data to compute regression (4), then we compute CARs using the CRSP value-weighted index return as the predicted return,R i,t+1 . 14 We display the short and long-term CAR of the monitoring index portfolios in Table 5 . We focus on the monitoring index portfolios because the index captures the joint effect of a target firm's level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership. Overall, the results in Table 9 confirm our previous findings with CARs that are statistically and economically significant at nearly every window and with each asset pricing model considered. Panel A of 
Stock Performance of Non-Acquired Firms
We find that hedge fund activists are able to generate larger abnormal returns for target firms with a lower external monitoring presence at the time of the 13D filing. Greenwood and Schor (2009), a study whose methods we follow, conclude that positive hedge fund activism returns are driven primarily by those firms in which the activist forces into a takeover. Indeed, they find that the CARs for target firms that are acquired at some point in the 18 months following the hedge fund activist's arrival are 5.72% and 25.85% in the [t − 10, t + 5] day and [t − 1, t + 18] month windows. This result is compared to firms that remain independent whose CARs are 2.36% and 2.85% over the [t − 10, t + 5] day and [t − 1, t + 18] month windows. It could be the case that firms with a lesser monitoring presence are easier for the hedge fund activist to market and eventually enter into a takeover. Therefore, the magnitude of the spread we find in this study may be driven by a large number of takeovers within our low monitoring portfolios.
We address this concern by eliminating firms within our monitoring portfolios that are acquired.
First, we identify the number of acquired firms within each of our monitoring index portfolios. Following Greenwood and Schor (2009), we classify a firm as acquired if the firm's CRSP delisting date is within 18 months of the initial 13D filing and if the first digit of the delisting code is two or three. As shown in Panels A of Table 10 , the greatest number of firms that are acquired occurs in the high monitoring index portfolios (120 firm events; 16.90% of portfolio sample). Moreover, the difference in acquisition percentage among the low and high monitoring index portfolios is 5.71%, resulting in a Chi-squared test statistic that is significant at the 1% level. This distribution of acquisitions among our monitoring portfolios is preliminary evidence against the argument that it may be easier for hedge fund activists to engage in acquisition activities with lesser monitored target firm.
In Panel B of Table 10 , we display the results from the same BHAR analysis that we used in In Panel C of Table 10 , we display the regression results using the same specification as in Table   5 . The effect a firm's monitoring index has on the future BHAR within the non-acquired sample exhibits a similar magnitude as we found before. In model (4), the coefficient on the monitoring index is −0.066, which implies that a one level increase in a firm's monitoring index leads to a decrease in the [t − 1, t + 6] month CAR of roughly 660 bps, on average. Similarly, in model (7), the coefficient on the monitoring index is −0.146. This coefficient equates to a decrease in the [t − 1, t + 24] month CAR of roughly 1, 460 bps, on average, for a one level increase in a firm's monitoring index. Overall, the results in Panels B and C alleviate the concern that our findings are driven by acquired target firms.
Conclusion
The academic literature supports the view that analysts and large institutions provide effective external monitoring of firms. Consequently, for existing shareholders, hedge fund activism should add little value when there is already a sufficient number of external monitors in place. Our results support this conjecture. Controlling for a wide range of firm characteristics, we find that hedge fund activism generates significantly greater abnormal returns in firms with a lower external monitoring presence. Furthermore, the ability of hedge fund activism to make positive changes in operating performance and firm value is decreasing in the target firm's ex-ante level of external monitors.
Ultimately, our results provide evidence that shareholder benefits from hedge fund activism depends greatly on the existing presence of external monitors at the firm.
15 Our results continue to hold when we use the same CAR approach used in Table 9 . In order for an initial 13D filing to be included in the sample, the target firm must have available data in the Compustat database in the calendar year t − 1 and t, where t is the year of the filing. Target firms must also have a stock price greater than $1 at the time of the initial 13D filing. Panel A presents the mean and quintile breakpoints of target firm characteristics taken from the most recent annual financial statements before the initial 13D filing date. Market cap is in millions and we compute market-to-book ratios as done in Fama and French (2008) . We calculate return on assets as EBITDA divided by the prior years total assets. We calculate cash flow to assets as the sum of net income and depreciation and amortization divided by the prior years total assets. Tobin's q is defined as the sum of the book value of debt and market cap, divided by the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity. We compute dividend yield as the total dividends reported in Compustat, divided by the sum of market cap and the value of preferred stock. Cash is cash and cash equivalents, scaled by total assets. We scale research and development spending and capital expenditures by the prior years total assets. We calculate leverage as the book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. We obtain institutional ownership from 13F filings in the most recent quarter before the initial 13D filing. Activist initial stake is as reported in the 13D filing (as reported by Audit Analytics) and dollar value of this stake is computed as price at the time of the filing times the number of shares acquired. Past 12 month return is the buy-and-hold return in the 12 months preceding the initial filing month. Past 12 month market-adjusted return is the buy and hold return in the 12 months preceding the initial filing month, less the CRSP value-weighted index return over this same time period. CAR [-1, 1] is the market-adjusted return around the date of the initial 13D filing computed using the CRSP value-weighted index. We compute analyst coverage as the number of unique analysts submitting a quarterly earnings forecast to the I/B/E/S database in any of the four quarters before the initial 13D filing quarter. We winsorize Compustat data at the 1% level. This table presents the monitoring portfolio market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in the short (daily) and long-term (monthly) windows around the initial 13D filing day / month (i.e. time 0). Daily (monthly) returns are used to compute BHARs for the short-term (long-term) windows. The sample includes all hedge fund activist events occurring in the years 2001 to 2014. In addition to the restrictions described in Table 1 , we require the target firm to have returns in CRSP covering the entire [−10, 25] day and [−1, 1] month windows. We compute BHAR using the CRSP value weighted index as the market return. Panel A shows the BHAR for each analyst coverage monitoring portfolio. Panel B shows the BHAR for each institutional ownership monitoring portfolio. Analyst and institutional ownership portfolios are formed based on the residual from a panel regression of analyst coverage (institutional ownership) regressed onto target firm market cap as of the date on the initial 13D filing. Panel C shows the BHAR for each monitoring index portfolio that we form based on the sum of the target firm's portfolio ranking regarding analyst coverage and institutional ownership. Low, mid, and high monitoring index portfolios consist of target firms with portfolio sums of two and three, four, and five and six. In each of the panels A, B, and C the last column displays that difference in BHAR between the low and high monitoring portfolios. We report t-statistics in parentheses and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * . This table presents multivariate regressions where we regress daily and monthly market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) onto each target firm's monitoring index. We compute BHARs, in decimal form, using the same method described in Table 4 . Models (1) and (2) (2002) . Average monthly beta is the average of a target firm's betas computed each month using the prior 12 months of daily returns. Average idiosyncratic volatility is the average of a target firm's monthly idiosyncratic volatility computed each month using daily returns and the Fama-French three factor model. All remaining controls are as described in Table 3 . All regressions include industry fixed effects that we determine using the 12 Fama-French industry classifications. We report heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * .
Short-term Long-term
BHAR [−10,10] BHAR [−10,25] BHAR [−1,3] BHAR [−1,6] BHAR [−1,12] BHAR [−1,18] BHAR [−1,24] Monitoring Index 0. Table 3 . All regressions include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects that we determine using the 12 Fama-French industry classifications. We report heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * .
(1) (2) (3) Table 3 . All regressions include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects that we determine using the 12 Fama-French industry classifications. We report heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * .
(1) Table 3 . All regressions include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects that we determine using the 12 Fama-French industry classifications. We report heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * .
(1) (2) (3) In the event we are unable to estimate the factor model, we use the market-adjusted return with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market return. Panels A, B, and C show the monitoring index portfolio CAR which we compute using the Fama-French three, four, five factor models. Low, mid, and high monitoring index portfolios are formed as described in Table 4 . In each of the panels A, B, and C, the last column displays that difference in CAR between the low and high monitoring portfolios. We report t-statistics in parentheses and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * . This table presents the monitoring portfolio daily and monthly market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), excluding those target firms which are acquired subsequent to the initial 13D filing date. We compute BHAR using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market return. We form monitoring portfolios using the same method described in Table 4 . Panel A shows the percent of acquired targets within each of the monitoring index portfolios. The last column of Panel A shows the difference in percents from the low and high monitoring portfolios, with significance determined using a Chi-Squared difference test. Panel B shows the daily and monthly BHAR around the initial 13D filing for the monitoring index portfolios. The last column of panel D displays the difference in BHAR between the low and high monitoring index portfolios. Panel C displays the results from multivariate regressions where we regress each target firm's BHAR onto their respective monitoring index. We use a regression specification and set of controls that are identical to the specification and controls we used in Table 5 . The complete regression output including our control variables is available upon request. We report heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates and we denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by * , * * , * * * . 
